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 Abstract
The aim of this paper is that of going “back to basics”, focusing on the importance of market
access issues for developing countries in the WTO negotiations begun in Doha in 2001. Data on
protection patterns in agriculture and manufacturing are analysed, with a special focus on the
issues of tariff peaks and escalation. The likely impact of several liberalisation scenarios is
evaluated using GTAP. The broad conclusion is that developing countries still have sizable
potential gains from improved market access in merchandise trade, but the size and the
distribution of these gains depend much on the extent to which developing countries will be
active in the liberalization process and on the agreed negotiation targets and modalities.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
The relationship of the developing countries with the WTO system has been at the centre
of a serious debate since the failed WTO Third Ministerial Meeting in Seattle in 1999.
Since the end of the Uruguay Round, developing countries have expressed considerable
concern about the implementation of the WTO agreements. On the one hand, market
access gains in developed countries’ markets did not materialize as expected. In
agriculture, the process of tariffication of non-tariff measures aggravated to some extent
the phenomena of tariff peaks and tariff escalation and the widespread use of tariff-
quotas and specific tariffs contributed to keep low the degree of transparency of
agricultural protection (Hathaway and Ingco, 1996). Moreover, some of the expected
gains from the removal of protection in textiles and clothing were offset by the use of
anti-dumping duties and special safeguards. On the other hand, while many developing
countries extended tariff bindings and lowered bound MFN tariffs on merchandise trade
after the Uruguay Round, their applied rates remained in many cases lower than the new
bound levels, generating few computable welfare gains (Safadi and Laird, 1996).
Concerning the new issues of trade in services, investment and intellectual property
rights, the commitments resulting from the Uruguay Round were often poorly understood
by developing countries and their implementation made difficult by the lack of
institutional and technical capacity (Stiglitz, 2000; Rodrik, 2001). Overall, the significant
economic gains that the Uruguay Round should have brought to the developing countries
according to estimates by scholars and international organizations simply never showed
up.1 Hence, while there were many points of disagreement in Seattle, development-
related issues were central, and have dominated the debate in the WTO in the whole
period starting from the failure of Seattle to the Doha Ministerial Meeting.
In Doha, WTO Ministers agreed in November 2001 to launch “a broad and balanced
work programme which includes an expanded negotiating agenda and other important
decisions and activities necessary to address the challenges facing the multilateral
trading system”.2   The agenda contains matters for immediate negotiation, matters for
future negotiations that are subject to “explicit consensus” among WTO Members on
                                                
1 For a tentative comparison of ex-ante and ex-post effects of the Uruguay Round on developing countries, see
Francois (2000).2
modalities, to be decided at the Fifth Ministerial Meeting (scheduled for 2003), and
matters for further examination in relevant WTO bodies. Among the matters on which
negotiations already started there are agriculture, services, industrial goods, environment,
anti-dumping subsidies and countervailing measures, dispute settlements, regional
agreements, and fisheries subsidies. So, in spite of the fact that “new issues” are
increasingly at the centre of WTO activism (services, investment, intellectual property,
competition policy, and so on), with the Doha Ministerial Meeting “traditional” market
access issues in merchandise trade have been revived in part because, going “back to
basics”, it is in merchandise trade that developing countries can realize most gains from
improved market access conditions. This is a prerequisite for any round aiming at
addressing the major concerns of developing countries. While negotiations on reducing
trade barriers and support measures in agriculture were part of the “built-in agenda”
established during the Uruguay Round, market access in industrial products was added to
the negotiating agenda in Doha.3 Moreover, in response to the demands of developing
countries, at Doha it has been agreed the need reduce not only the average level of
merchandise tariffs but also the distortions brought about by tariff peaks and tariff
escalation.
The objective of this paper is twofold. The first aim of the paper is to provide a
descriptive analysis of the current pattern of protection faced by developing countries’
merchandise exports in major markets, with a special focus on the issues of tariff peaks
and tariff escalation. It is shown that the post-Uruguay Round protection pattern is
characterized by a high dispersion in tariff rates, with a large number of tariff peaks
concentrated on products of interest to developing countries in agriculture, food, textiles,
apparel and some mid-technology products. Moreover, tariff escalation appears to be a
pervasive phenomenon both in agriculture and industrial goods, and characterizes both
developed and developing countries markets. This evidence supports the view that in the
definition of liberalization modalities an appropriate role should be given not only to the
reduction of average rates but also to the elimination of the distortions that characterize
the sectoral structure of protection in many markets.
                                                                                                                                           
2 WTO document, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 of 20 November 2001
3 Support for negotiations in market access for industrial products, essentially tariff negotiations, grew up to and
beyond Seattle.  This support seems to have been based on the realization that inclusion of industrial products3
The second objective of the paper is to assess the impact of several trade policy reform
scenarios on developing countries’ economies through computable general equilibrium
simulations. We will address several “strategic” questions from the developing countries’
perspective: will developing countries benefit from further reducing their own applied
tariff rates in agricultural sectors? Will they gain from the inclusion of industrial goods
in the next round of multilateral liberalization? How liberalization gains (and losses) will
be split across different developing countries’ groups? Compared with existing work, we
have modified data on tariff preferences contained in the GTAP5 database to take into
account preferential tariff regimes using UNCTAD TRAINS data. It is estimated that a
50 per cent reduction of tariffs in agriculture would increase world welfare by about $20
billion, a figure that is in line with those obtained in recent studies. All world regions
would gain from agricultural liberalization. Moreover, there is no developing world
region that would gain by not participating actively in further efforts to liberalize
agriculture. As found in previous analyses, reducing export subsidies may impact
negatively on some developing net food importing regions (e.g., North Africa and
Middle East), due to adverse terms of trade developments. Finally, extending
liberalization to all merchandise trade would almost double the aggregate gains to
developing countries.  However, the distribution of gains and losses from a
comprehensive liberalization scenario would be unequal across different groups of
developing countries. While most Asian countries would gain substantially if tariff cuts
in manufacturing were added to liberalization in agriculture, Sub-Saharan Africa may
not.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 illustrates aspects of the
patterns of protection in merchandise trade of special interest to developing countries.
Section 3 presents the CGE modelling framework and the simulated impact of several
alternative liberalization scenarios in merchandise trade. Section 4 concludes with some
policy suggestions.
                                                                                                                                           
would permit some cross sectoral trade-offs with the built-in market access negotiations on agriculture and
services.4
II. THE PATTERN OF PROTECTION FACED BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’
MERCHANDISE EXPORTS: SOME SALIENT FEATURES
Tables 1 and 2 provide aggregate evidence on the world pattern of protection, taken
from the GTAP database, version 5, as modified to incorporate our new data on
reciprocal or unilateral (GSP, Cotonou, etc) preferences.4 The tables show ad valorem
protection rates separately for 12 aggregate importing regions. Sectors are aggregated
into 6 broad categories; food and processed agriculture is shown separately from primary
agriculture goods.
Table 1 show the expected worldwide concentration of protection in agriculture and
textiles and apparel.  The only regions in which manufactures are still substantially
protected are South Asia, Africa, Transition Economies and Latin America. In general,
processed agriculture is more protected than primary agriculture (a notable exception are
Asian NICs). Those regions that protect more agriculture are Western Europe, Japan and
North Africa. Textiles are particularly protected in South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and
Latin America.  By contrast, Table 2 reports the ad valorem protection rates faced by
different exporting regions in the world market. The world regions that face higher
protection against their agricultural exports are China, Oceania and North America.  In
manufacturing, the regions that face the highest levels of protection are Japan and China,
whereas in textiles they are China, Asian NICs and Transition Economies.
Overall, the structure of protection in major markets - developed and developing -
appears to be biased against sectors of interest for developing countries (agriculture,
textiles and clothing).  The aggregate data presented in Tables 1 and 2 also provides
prima facie evidence on tariff escalation in agriculture: tariffs tend to increase with the
level of processing. What is not possible to capture with such broad sectoral aggregates
is the strong dispersion of tariff rates that characterizes many important markets. In spite
of relatively low average protection rates, particular product categories, defined at a
possibly very disaggregate level, may be subject to high or very high tariffs.  We now
turn to the issue of tariff peaks and tariff escalation from the perspective of developing
countries’ market access.
                                                
4 See Section 3.1 for details on the GTAP protection database and the procedure followed to include preferences.5
II.i  Tariff peaks
It is widely agreed among the economic profession that a relatively uniform tariff
structure is preferable to one exhibiting considerable dispersion. At least two reasons are
advanced as justifying a flat tariff structure. First, the costs in terms of welfare and
economic inefficiency of a tariff regime increase as the degree of dispersion increases.
Second, the case for a uniform tariff structure receives strong support from the political
economy arguments that uniform tariff rates more transparent and easier to administer
than non-uniform tariffs, and that they are less likely to be determined by the relative
political power of domestic industries.
Despite such arguments, the tariff structure of most countries continues to show a
remarkable degree of dispersion, reflecting the outcome of pressures from domestic
lobbies. The reduction in average tariff rates achieved in the past decades in many
countries (following seven GATT rounds, more than 100 active regional trade
agreements and extensive unilateral trade policy reforms) coincided to a certain extent
with reduced rate dispersion in most countries. However, after the implementation of the
Uruguay Round, and the consequent tariffication of non-tariff protection in agriculture,
dispersion in tariff rates did not fall substantially, and even increased in some instances.
Especially in the case of agriculture, protection was lowered mostly on the items already
characterized by relatively low barriers, while the tariffication procedures did little to
reduce protection on highly protected goods such as dairy, meat, sugar and so on.
Overall, the phenomenon of tariff peaks seems to have been aggravated.
In major developed countries’ markets, a relevant number of tariff peaks concerns
products of interest for developing countries. Consistently, after the conclusion of the
Uruguay round, the developing countries' strongest demands in terms of market access
in developed countries were less targeted against overall applied MFN tariffs but more
importantly towards the reduction of distortions affecting trade in agriculture and other
specific products of interest.6
The degree to which tariff peaks in developed countries’ markets affect various
agricultural developing countries’ exports can be assessed by looking at Table 3, which
presents statistics for weighted average applied MFN tariff rates in selected products.
The highest tariff dispersion is found in tobacco products and in some dairy products.
The products with the highest standard deviations are also the ones where the highest
maximum tariffs are found (even above 300 per cent). In terms of frequency of tariff
peaks across agricultural products (expressed as the percentage of lines affected by tariff
peaks in the total number of lines) the most affected sectors by domestic tariff peaks
(i.e., tariff rates above 3 times the national average) are beef (more than 52 per cent) and
chocolate (more than 32 per cent). The highest frequency of international tariff peaks
(i.e., rates above 15 per cent) is also found in beef, followed by diary products (milk and
butter). It is important to remark that looking at ad valorem tariffs is not enough to
capture the incidence and magnitude of tariff peaks in agriculture, since many items are
subject to specific rates. Taking into account of these duties would increase substantially
the ad valorem equivalents of protection in a number of product categories.
Industrial products have been on the multilateral agenda from the very beginning of the
GATT, and successive rounds of negotiations have reduced the overall tariffs much
more than in other sectors.  As a result, average MFN tariffs on manufactures are quite
low, while applied rates have fallen even lower under unilateral reforms. Despite these
trends, as shown in Table 4 tariff rates in most major markets remain quite dispersed.
Standard deviations and the spread between minimum and maximum rates are quite
high, confirming the wide presence of tariff peaks. When looking at the percentage of
domestic peaks, among developed markets North America counts more than Western
Europe or Japan, while Latin America has the highest value among developing country
groups.5 Concerning the sectoral incidence of tariff peaks, Table 5 presents data on
weighted average applied MFN tariff rates in Quad markets on developing country
exports by product categories defined according to their technological sophistication.
The highest tariff dispersion is found in textiles (Canada, Japan, US), automotive (EU),
and medium technology process industries.  In terms of domestic peaks, their incidence
                                                
5 In the case of Latin America for instance, many countries in the region maintain a flat bound tariff rate on
industrial products (WTO, 2001) but applied rates vary significantly. Therefore, for these individual countries
the average number of domestic peaks is equal to zero.7
is higher in the US and Canada, and affect especially textiles, low technology
manufactures, and medium technology process industries.
II.ii   Tariff escalation
The practice of tariff escalation (higher protection for more processed goods) biases
exports towards unprocessed resource-based commodities, characterized by low value
added. This may cause difficulties to commodity-dependent developing countries in
their attempt to diversify their export base. Although these claims have been well
evidenced and long voiced, the extent of tariff escalation remains still significant. An
issue to be resolved in order to identify the extent to which tariff escalation is present
concerns the identification of different production chains and how different products can
be classified as raw, semi-finished or finished.  In Table 6 MFN tariff rates in Quad
markets are presented for selected product categories distinguishing the stage of
processing (raw, finished, semi-finished). With few exceptions, post-Uruguay round
tariffs escalate not only between raw and semi-finished but also, where appropriate,
between semi-finished and finished. On average, the escalation in Canada and Japan and
the EU is higher between finished and raw while in the US the highest average
escalation is found between semi-finished and finished goods.  The same phenomenon
appears in industrial products where the average post-Uruguay Round tariff for all
industrial products ranges from 0.8 per cent on raw materials to 4.8 per cent on the
finished product. Table 7 shows that tariff escalation is present both in developed and
developing countries.6
In summary, the data shows that although average tariff rates on manufactures in
developed countries have been reduced to fairly low levels, tariff peaks appear to be
concentrated on products of interest to developing countries like textiles and low-
medium technology products. Moreover, the phenomenon of tariff escalation is quite
widespread, affects both agricultural and industrial products, and is present in markets of
both developed and developing countries. Any round intended to address effectively the
                                                
6 As noted in the case of Quad countries’ markets, in most cases escalation in developing countries is greatest
between raw and finished products. However, similar to the case of the US, in Asian NICs, there is de-
escalation between raw and semi-finished products, and the highest escalation is found between finished and
semi-finished products.8
market access concerns of developing countries must find solutions to reduce the
distortions brought about by the presence of tariff peaks and the bias against products of
low-medium stages of processing.
III  ESTIMATED GAINS FROM MULTILATERAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION
In recent years, several CGE analyses of the effects of trade policy reforms in a future
WTO Round have been produced. Some of them only consider agricultural
liberalization, other include manufacturing tariff reform. Only a few analyses consider
the impact of service trade liberalization, mainly because of poor data on trade flows in
the services sector and poor measurement of service trade barriers. Table 8 summarizes
the findings of recent CGE work concerning the global gains associated with future
possible trade liberalization scenarios. Results differ quite widely, especially when broad
liberalization scenarios are considered (i.e., when manufacturing and services
liberalization are included).7 The sources of the discrepancies are several. Much of the
difference in the estimated gains is to be attributed to a different assessment of the
liberalization prospects. Some studies assume deeper or more comprehensive cuts in
trade barriers than other. However, results are also sensitive to the model specification.
In particular, liberalization gains are higher in models allowing for increasing returns to
scale and imperfect competition in the manufacturing sector. The gains are further
enhanced in specifications allowing for dynamic effects of trade liberalization, associated
with trade-related changes in savings and investment or with developments in
productivity. A further motive for differences in results has to do with the chosen
baseline.  In most recent studies, the GTAP dataset is used to replicate the world
economy, and the most recent versions of the dataset tend to yield lower estimates of the
liberalization effects since the trade barriers have been modified to reflect recent
liberalization.  Finally, the estimates from CGE models are quite sensitive to their
dimensionality (the number of sectors and regions considered), the chosen values for
elasticity parameters and the followed closure rule.8
                                                
7 Among noteworthy attempts to compare the effects of the Uruguay Round obtained from alternative CGE
experiments, see Martin and Winters (1996), Francois (2000) and Whalley (2000).
8 The closure rule specifies which variables are considered exogenous in the model. In particular, the modeller has
to choose whether to allow for an endogenous determination of the trade balance or to fix it at the same value
as that in the status quo. As far as elasticity parameters are concerned, it is to note that higher values for
substitution elasticities in demand tend to be associated with bigger liberalization effects.9
It is worth noting the very large gains that have been estimated for liberalization of trade
in services (Brown, Deardoff and Stern, 2001; World Bank, 2001). These large gains are
due to two basic reasons. First, services account for a large share in consumption in most
middle and high-income countries, much larger for instance than that of agriculture.
Second, services are major inputs in the production of manufactures (and of other
services). Hence, any trade-related reduction in the prices of services will translate into a
widespread productivity gain for liberalizing economies. For these reasons, CGE models
tend to yield high gains from the liberalization of the service sector, especially when
trade-induced effects on productivity are taken into account (see, e.g., World Bank,
2001). Having said that, the CGE modelling of liberalization in the service is still very
tentative. The limitations of these exercises are not only found in the lack of reliable and
comprehensive data on trade flows and trade barriers in services, but also in the
difficulties encountered in making operational such measures in CGE analysis and in
representing adequately the major links through which trade liberalization in service
trade affects the whole economy.
A final caveat to be mentioned with the use CGE models concerns the usual assumption
of efficient factor markets and the neglect of supply side rigidities and bottlenecks. In
developing countries, factor markets are far from efficient (mainly due to
underdeveloped institutions and imperfect inter-sectoral mobility) and supply rigidities
are quite widespread. Ignoring these characteristic features of developing economies may
lead to an overestimation of the short-run allocation gains associated with trade
liberalization.
Notwithstanding the notable differences in results coming from different CGE analyses,
it is possible to identify a number of common findings. First, the global welfare results
concerning agricultural liberalization are quite similar across models and studies. This
convergence of estimates for agricultural liberalization is to a large extent due to a
consensus of modelling agriculture as a constant returns to scale sector where trade-
related dynamic gains are quite limited. A second common feature of static, constant
returns to scale CGE models is that the share of global gains associated with (full)
agricultural liberalization are not very different from those originating from trade10
liberalization in manufactures. Concerning the source of the gains, almost all studies
show that the major source of the gains accruing to each country is its own liberalization,
rather than that of partner countries.9 As for the distribution of the global gains between
developed and developing countries, in the majority of the studies it is found that the
gains are shared quite equally between the two groups. Among developing countries,
Asian countries will reap the biggest gains (especially if manufacturing is also
liberalized), while the gains for Latin American and African countries will be more
limited.
III.i   Simulated liberalization scenarios
In this section, we evaluate the effects on the world economy of alternative liberalization
scenarios using computable general equilibrium (CGE) techniques, focusing on
merchandise trade, in particular agriculture for which the effects of both tariffs and
export subsidies are analysed.   The assumed liberalization scenarios should not be
considered as an attempt to reproduce closely the outcome of the current WTO trade
negotiations.10 The aim is rather that of defining a range for the possible magnitude of
gains and losses associated with possible trade policy reforms that may be implemented
in the years ahead and to assess how these gains and losses might be distributed across
countries. Two main features characterize the following analysis with respect to previous
studies. First, the status-quo protection figures take into account the existence of
preferential tariff schemes associated with non-reciprocal arrangements (e.g., the GSP)
and with all major regional trade arrangements.  Second, the eventuality of non-
reciprocal liberalization in agriculture is considered, based on the fact that WTO
commitments concern the level of bound tariffs, and that for many developing countries
actual tariffs in agriculture are quite low compared with bound rates.
The model used in the simulation is the standard static GTAP model, with perfect
                                                
9 See, on this point, Safadi and Laird (1996) and World Bank (2001), p. 1671.
10 There are several difficulties in simulating the outcome of actual multilateral trade agreements. First, what are
negotiated at the WTO are bound tariffs, not applied tariffs. Databases for CGE analysis such as GTAP only
include values for applied rates, and not for bound rates (see, however, Francois, 2000b) for a study using
bound instead of applied tariff rates). Second, the committed cuts in protection may be quite different from
those actually implemented. This is one of the basic reasons why the early studies on the Uruguay Round
effects estimated bigger gains compared with later studies (see, e.g., Francois, 2000a and Whalley, 2000).11
competition in all sectors and constant returns to scale.11  In spite of the well-known
limitations of standard CGE models (absence of dynamic effects, perfect market
clearing, lack of robustness with respect to model parameters, and so on), they are useful
tool for assessing an order of magnitude for the distribution of gains and losses of trade
liberalization, especially when the major trade reforms are assumed to take place in
agriculture.  In the experiment, the structure of the model is kept simple, so that
liberalization gains and losses emerging from simulation analysis are easy to interpret,
being associated with changes in allocative efficiency and in the terms of trade. While
sectors will be kept quite aggregate, countries will be relatively disaggregated in the
analysis, and will be grouped according to geography and level of development.
The database is GTAP5, modified in order to account for tariff preferences (available
from the UNCTAD TRAINS database) as illustrated in Tables 1 and 2.  The protection
data are based on applied MFN tariffs and the ad valorem equivalents for non-tariff
protection in agriculture and in textiles and clothing.12  Thus, GTAP protection data
give a convenient ad valorem assessment of most of the trade barriers currently used by
governments. The preferences rates that we have added include non-reciprocal
agreements, such as GSP and the Cotonou Agreement (successor to the Lomé Agreement
covering EU-ACP preferences), as well as reciprocal regional trade agreements
(NAFTA, EFTA, EU, etc.).
The main focus of the experiments is on agricultural liberalization, which is both part of
the built-in WTO agenda and one of the major pillars of the WTO Doha Declaration.
                                                
11 For a description of the GTAP model see Hertel (1997). Consumers have the same non-homothetic preferences,
according to which allocate income between private consumption, public consumption and savings. Products are
differentiated à-la Armington. The elasticity of substitution between any pair of domestic and imported goods is
constant within each sector, and the elasticity of substitution between each pair of imported goods originating
from different countries is twice higher than that between domestic and foreign goods. On the production side,
intermediate inputs and primary factors are used in fixed proportions while the subsititutability between different
inputs and between different production factors is captured by a CES aggregator. Returns to production factors
accrue to households in terms of income. Private income, in turn, feeds into consumption demand and savings
after being taxed or increased by public transfers. Households’ savings finance investment, and investment does
not affect the current capital stock. Countries can borrow and lend abroad. In the closure used for our simulations
total world savings add up to total world investment and expected rates of returns on savings are equalized across
world regions.
12 For agriculture, the protective power of specific duties, combined duties and TRQs are translated into ad
valorem equivalents. Non-tariff protection in textiles and apparel takes often the form of voluntary export
restraints administered by exporters under the Multi-Fibre-Agreement. In GTAP, this is modelled as a vector
of ad valorem export taxes.12
The aggregation of six sectors and 12 world regions is chosen to isolate the sectors most
likely to be greatly affected by trade liberalization, allowing for an analysis of the effects
of tariff escalation in agriculture and to aggregate countries to the smallest number of
regions with some degree of geographical and economic homogeneity.
In the first experiment, a worldwide reduction of 50 per cent in all agricultural tariffs
brings about an aggregate welfare gain of $21.5 billion (Table 9), an overall estimate that
is in line with other studies using the GTAP5 database, but the distributional effects are
different. All the world regions appear to gain, but gains differ widely both in absolute
and relative terms.  The largest absolute gains are captured by Japan, North America, the
Newly Industrializing Asian Countries (NICs), North Africa and Middle East, and
Oceania. In percentage terms, those regions that appear to gain most are Oceania, the
Asian NICs and North Africa. The estimated percentage gain for Sub-Saharan Africa and
Latin America is lower than in other studies conducted under similar assumptions (e.g.,
Diao, Somwaru, and Roe, 2001, van Meijl and van Tongeren, 2001). This is likely
because of the inclusion of tariff preferences in the protection database.  Since Africa and
Latin America are among the major beneficiaries of preferential schemes, it seems likely
that the gains from liberalization for these countries in other studies could be overstated
when full account is not taken of tariff preferences as has been done here.
Looking at aggregate trade indicators (Table 10), the value of exports rise in all regions
after liberalization.  Lower worldwide protection in agriculture translates into increased
worldwide import demand and improved trade opportunities in all areas. Not all regions,
however, profit equally from the increased trade potential. While the value of exports
rise considerably in relative terms in Africa, Oceania and Latin America, export gains are
quite modest for Western Europe.13  As for terms of trade changes, the improvement is
substantial for Oceania, while the biggest losses are observed in Japan, North Africa and
South Asia.
                                                
13 As found, for instance, in Diao, Somwaru and Roe (2000) and van Meijl and van Tongeren (2000). Francois
(2000), in a model including both imperfect competition and dynamic investments related effects, finds much
bigger gains for Western Europe.13
The second experiment is the elimination of export subsidies in agriculture, without
parallel changes in tariffs.14  The results show modest worldwide welfare losses (Table
11). These losses are mainly explained by worsened resource allocation within countries,
as export subsidies are eliminated while other major distortions remain. After the
elimination of subsidies, all regions except Europe start increasing their agricultural
value added.15  However, since many countries still face high protection against their
agricultural exports, this shift appears to be counterproductive.  Most regions actually
stand to lose from the elimination of subsidies, while the gains appear to be very
concentrated in Western Europe - which is the area characterized by the highest value of
initial subsidies - and in regions that are net agricultural exporters, like Oceania and
Latin America.16  Western Europe gains both from better resource allocation (the
elimination of subsidies brings the specialization pattern of this regions more in line with
its comparative advantages) and improved terms of trade. The removal of export
subsidies directly reduces the agricultural exports of Western Europe, thus leading to a
lower world supply for these goods and to improved terms of trade for Europe, whose
exports are sold now at higher prices on international markets. As for the terms-of-trade
effects on the other regions, they depend on their agricultural export pattern. Countries
that are net agriculture and food exporters (like North America, Oceania and Latin
America) are likely to gain, while those that are not may lose (e.g. Asian NICs and North
Africa).
Aggregate trade data (Table 12) show that trade flows are reduced in some regions and
increased in others by the elimination of subsidies. The largest percentage drop in
exports occurs in Sub-Saharan Africa and in Western Europe. Western Europe exports
drop because of the direct effect of the elimination of export subsidies. The fall in Sub-
                                                
14 GTAP data on exports subsidies are derived from countries’ notifications to the WTO (year 1998) concerning
their subsidy expenditures. Only a limited number of countries notified export subsidies: the UE and EFTA,
some Eastern Europe transition economies (Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic), the US (dairy products
only) and a few other middle and low-income countries (Colombia, South Africa, Turkey). The simulation
consists of setting to zero the value of export subsidies in primary and processed agriculture in Western
Europe and Transition Economies and in the US for what concerns processed agriculture (which comprises
dairy products).
15 This simulation result is not reported (yet it is available on request). Intuitively, after the elimination of
subsidies, domestic prices fall compared with world prices in the subsidizing regions (e.g., the EU), leading
to a shift of resources away from agriculture in these regions. Conversely, the reduced supply from
subsidizing regions translates into higher world prices. This induces a shift towards agricultural production in
non-subsidizing regions.14
Saharan Africa exports is mainly associated with reduced agricultural imports by
Western Europe coming from that region.  In fact, after the elimination of export
subsidies, agricultural imports (in value) fall in the EU (due to a reduced difference
between domestic and world prices) and the region suffering most from that is Africa, for
which the European market is of great relevance. Conversely, the exports of Latin
America, Oceania and South Asia increase substantially in value, mainly as a result of
improved terms of trade (higher world prices for agricultural products).17
In the third experiment, intended to look at the effects of tariff escalation in agriculture,
tariffs are reduced by 50 per cent on processed agriculture only. Under this scenario, the
global gains are roughly half those obtained in the prior simulation of liberalization in all
agricultural sectors (Table 13).  However, the distribution of the gains is quite different.
While North America, Oceania and all Asian regions achieve gains that are considerably
smaller than those arising under liberalization of all agricultural sectors, Africa and Latin
America obtain gains of a similar size, and Western Europe even finds the option of
limiting liberalization to processed agriculture preferable. The lesser gains for South
Asia than under the full liberalization scenario is explained by the high level of
protection in primary agriculture in that region (Table 1). Limiting liberalization to
processed agriculture results in terms of trade losses for Western Europe, but the
allocation gains would prevail. As for North America and Oceania, the lower gains than
under the full liberalization scenario are mainly due to unexploited terms of trade gains:
both regions are net exporters of primary agriculture and would gain from its
liberalization in terms of better export prices. Finally, the fact that African and Latin
American regions appear to gain mostly from liberalization in processed agriculture is
associated with the heavy protection faced by their processed agriculture and food
exports, especially in Western Europe and Japan. These findings therefore support the
thesis that developing countries bear the larger share of costs arising from tariff
escalation in agriculture.
                                                                                                                                           
16 Similar results are obtained, for instance, in Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (1996) and Diao, Somwaru and Roe
(2001).
17 Should the removal of export subsidies in agriculture be coupled with reduction in domestic support, the
positive terms of trade effect on countries that are net agricultural exporters (e.g., Latin America, Oceania)
would be strengthened further. In such a case, however, domestic production in Europe would fall even more,
and this would lead to a more modest reduction in European imports, which would be of particular advantage
to African countries.15
Many developing countries apply agricultural tariffs that are well below the values
bound as a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations. The fourth experiment, therefore,
consists of a liberalization scenario in which developing countries, either because they
are already applying rates lower than the bound ones, or for some other reason, are not
reducing their applied tariffs in agriculture.  For the purposes of this exercise, a “broad”
definition of developing country is considered: only Western Europe, North America,
Japan and Oceania are treated as developed. In this scenario, only these regions make a
policy change, by making a 50 per cent cut in their agricultural tariffs. Under this
scenario, there is a considerable reduction in global gains compared with those arising
from a worldwide tariff cut (Table 15).  Under the assumptions of the model, developing
countries would not benefit from not participating into liberalization. Conversely, the
larger share of the gains is captured by Japan, Oceania and North America, i.e., by
liberalizing countries. In spite of the fact that all developing countries would benefit
from improved terms of trade (the better market access conditions in developed countries
are not reciprocated), the allocation gains are so small that no developing country would
benefit by not joining agricultural liberalization. While non-reciprocal liberalization can
be helpful to beneficiary countries when targeted to a restricted number of beneficiaries,
due to a “fallacy of composition” argument the positive effects on the terms of trade are
very small when the beneficiaries are the developing countries as a whole.18  So, all
regions fare less well than in the case of a tariff reduction implemented worldwide.
Interestingly enough, those regions that lose more with respect to worldwide
liberalization are not developed countries, but some highly protected developing regions
that do not have a comparative advantage in agriculture, such as Asian NICs, South Asia
and North Africa.  Looking at export changes (Table 16), it may be noted that, by not
joining liberalization, developing countries compromise their own export expansion
possibilities, since resources remain employed in import-competing sectors. The increase
in exports of each developing region is higher when liberalization occurs worldwide.
Finally, under the fifth scenario there is a worldwide 50 per cent reduction of all
merchandise tariffs.  This results in a global welfare gain that is almost twice that arising
                                                
18 See, for instance, Ianchivichina, Mattoo and Olarreaga (2001) and Bora, Cernat and Turrini (2001) for recent
CGE assessments of the benefits received from LDCs from receiving duty and quota-free access in developed
countries’ markets.16
from liberalization in agriculture only (Table 17).19 The big gainers from adding
manufacturing liberalization to agriculture liberalization are the Asian regions. Some
countries, however, do not experience any advantage from extending liberalization
beyond agriculture. These are especially North America, Transition Economies and Sub-
Saharan Africa, which would suffer from terms of trade losses by adding manufacturing
liberalization.  All these regions would see their market shares in textiles and clothing
and other manufactures eroded by increased imports from Asia.
The removal of all tariff protection boosts exports in all areas (Table 18). The increase is
in general much stronger than that associated with the elimination of agricultural tariffs
only. The pattern of changes in export values is quite clear. The biggest increases in
exports occur in low to middle-income Asian countries (China, South Asia), followed by
other developing countries and by Japan and Oceania. Western Europe and North
America do not achieve a major expansion of their exports.  Overall, these results
confirm what has been found in previous studies (e.g., Hertel and Martin, 2000, Hertel et
al., 1999), namely, that the inclusion of manufacturing liberalization in a “comprehensive
round” of negotiations would be especially interesting for the developing countries.
However, while this conclusion holds for developing economies taken as a single broad
aggregate, there are regions, markedly Sub-Saharan Africa, that – under the assumptions
of the model - might actually lose from extending liberalization from agriculture alone to
all merchandise trade.
IV   CONCLUSIONS
One of the most challenging tasks for Doha Ministerial Meeting was to ensure that the
concerns of the developing countries were reflected in the negotiating mandates, and in
the area of market access the texts agreed at Doha provide an opportunity to improve the
developing countries' effective participation in the international trade.  To this end, the
Doha meeting revived the “traditional” market access issues in merchandise trade, and
the estimates provided in this paper show that the inclusion of market access is fully
justified if Doha is to meet its development objectives.
                                                
19 Note that these figures should be considered as lower bounds, since important sources of liberalization gains in
manufacturing such as the exploitation of scale economies and the availability of imported inputs are
neglected.17
The paper shows that, in spite of the now fairly low average levels of MFN protection in
major markets, there are biases against exports of interest to developing countries that
can be fully understood only by analysing the structure of tariffs at a very disaggregated
level.  In certain Quad markets (EU and Japan, especially) MFN tariff peaks in some
processed agriculture and food categories can be so high as to displace completely
exports from developing countries in absence of any preferential regime. Likewise, in
textiles and clothing and some low-medium technology manufactures, the share of MFN
domestic tariff peaks in US and Canada is remarkably high. Finally, the structure of
tariffs tend to escalate with the level of processing in almost all major world markets, a
feature that may hamper the transition of developing countries’ exports towards products
with higher levels of value added.
Tariff peaks and escalation may be tackled in future negotiations by means of a
harmonising formula such as the Swiss formula, used in the Tokyo Round (Laird, 1999).
In any event, whatever the criterion followed to achieve tariff cuts, the possibility of
having exceptions for particular products should be avoided: in general, exceptions tend
to concentrate where existing protection is the highest.
Apart from the question of liberalization modalities, there are also certain important
questions about liberalization strategies. Will developing countries gain from further
reducing their applied rates in agriculture? Would be in their interest adding industrial
goods among the sectors to be liberalized? Which world regions would gain most from
the next Round? We address the above issues through CGE analysis. Although, because
of modelling and data limitations, emphasis on specific numbers and figures arising from
CGE analysis should be avoided, some qualitative results seem quite robust and are
worth to mention. First, tariff cuts in agriculture would result in higher allocative gains
than the elimination of export subsidies. Since the elimination of export subsidies per se
may hurt some developing world regions (e.g. North Africa and Middle East), due to
increased import prices for food and reduced import demand from Europe, reductions in
applied tariffs in agriculture need to accompany the elimination of export subsidies. A
second key result is that there is no broadly defined developing world region that would
gain by not participating into agricultural liberalization. It is a common finding that the18
larger share of liberalization gains comes from liberalization of the domestic market than
from better market access conditions in other markets. Third, reducing the extent of tariff
escalation would improve the situation of a large share of developing countries. The
majority of gains from agricultural liberalization accruing to African an Latin American
countries comes in fact from the elimination of tariffs on food and processed agriculture
only.  Finally, on aggregate, developing countries would gain substantially from adding
manufacturing liberalization to agricultural liberalization. However, while gains to
developing Asia would be high, Sub-Saharan Africa may not gain by adding
manufacturing MFN liberalization to liberalization in agriculture.
In evaluating these findings it is important to recall that no account is taken of potential
dynamic effects (e.g., through trade and investment linkages), nor of adjustment costs
and implementation issues (e.g., replacing foregone tariff revenue with alternative taxes).
These cost are likely to be relevant especially in developing countries with undiversified
economies, poorly working factor markets and inadequate infrastructure. The provision
of technical assistance to develop export capacity in these countries may help them to
fully profit from better market access associated with further multilateral liberalization.
Programmes targeted at the formation of social safety nets may help to offset the costs of
adjustment associated with liberalization in the domestic market or arising from changes
in the terms of trade.19
REFERENCES
Anderson, K., B. Hoekman and A. Strutt, (1999), “Agriculture and the WTO: Next
Steps”, Revision of a paper prepared for the Second Annual Conference on Global
Economic Analysis, Avernaes Conference Centre, Helnaes, Denmark, 20-22 June
1999.
Anderson, K., J. Francois, T. Hertel, B. Hoekman, and W. Martin, (2000), “Potential
Gains from Trade Reform in the New Millennium”, Paper presented at the Third
Annual Conference on Global Economic Analysis, Monash University, June 27-
30.
Bora, B., L. Cernat and A. Turrini (2001). “Duty and Quota-Free Access for LDCs:
Further Evidence from CGE Modelling”, UNCTAD Policy Issues in International
Trade and Commodities Study Series, forthcoming.
Brown, D. K., A. V. Deardorff and R. M. Stern (2001). “CGE Modelling and Analysis of
Multilateral and Regional Negotiation Options”, Research Seminar in
International Economics, Discussion Paper No. 468.
Dessus, S., K. Fukasaku, and R. Safadi, (1999), “Multilateral Tariff Liberalization and
the Developing Countries”, OECD Development Centre Policy Brief No. 18,
OECD, Paris.
Diao, X., A. Somwaru and T. Roe (2001). “A Global Analysis of Agricultural Reform in
WTO Member Countries”, in Agricultural Policy Reform – The Road Ahead /
AER, 802, 25-42.
Francois, J. (2000a). “Assessing the Results of General Equilibrium Studies of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations”, UNCTAD Policy Issues in International Trade
and Commodities Study Series No. 3.
Francois, J. (2000b). “The Economic Impact of New Multilateral Trade Negotiations:
Final Report”, report prepared for DG-II of the European Commission.
Harrison, G.W., T. F. Rutherford and D.G. Tarr (1996), “Quantifying the Uruguay
Round”, in W. Martin and L. A. Winters (eds), The Uruguay Round and the
Developing Countries, Cambridge University Press, New York and Economic
Journal, 1997, 107, No. 44, 1405-1430.20
Hathaway, D., and M. Ingco, (1996), “Agricultural Liberalization and the Uruguay
Round”, in W. Martin and L. A. Winters (eds), The Uruguay Round and the
Developing Countries, Cambridge University Press, New York.
Hertel, T. W., K. Anderson, J. F. Francois and W. Martin (1999). “Agriculture and Non-
agricultural Liberalization in the Millenium Round”, paper presented at the 1999
Global Conference on Agriculture and the New Trade Agenda from a
Development Perspective; Interests and Options in the WTO 2000 Negotiations,
Geneva October 1-2 1999.
Hertel, Thomas W. ed., Global trade analysis : modeling and applications, Cambridge;
New York : Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Hertel, W., and  Martin,W,. (2000). "Liberalizing Agriculture and Manufactures in a
Millennium Round: Implications for Developing Countries," World Economy 23:
455-470.
Ianchovichina, E., A. Mattoo and M. Olarreaga (2000). “Unrestricted Market Access for
Sub-Saharan Africa: How much is it worth and who pays?”, World Bank,
Washington DC, mimeo.
Laird, S. (1999), "Multilateral Approaches to Market Access Negotiations", in Trade
Rules in the Making (Eds. Miguel Rodríguez Mendoza. Barbara Kotschwar and
Patrick Low), Brookings Institution, Washington D.C.
Lall, S. (2000) 'The Technological Structure and Performance of Developing Country
Manufactured Exports: 1985-1998', Queen Elizabeth House Working Paper no.
44, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford.
Martin, W. and A. Winters (1996), “The Uruguay Round: A Milestone for the
Developing Countries”, in W. Martin and L. A. Winters (eds), The Uruguay
Round and the Developing Countries, Cambridge University Press, New York
Nagarajan, N., (1999), “The Millenium Round: An Economic Appraisal”, Commission
of the European Communities, Economic Papers, ECFIN/659/99-Rev.EN.
Rodrik, D. (2001), “The Global Governance of Trade as if Development Really
Mattered”, report prepare for the UNDP, mimeo.
Safadi, R. and S. Laird (1996). “The Uruguay Round Agreements: Impact on Developing
Countries”, World Development, 24, No. 7, 1223-1242.21
Scollay, R. and J. Gilbert (2001). “An Integrated Approach to Agricultural Trade and
Development Issues: Exploring the Welfare and Distribution Issues”, UNCTAD
Policy Issues in International Trade and Commodities Study Series No. 11.
Stiglitz, J. E. (2000). “Two Principles for the Next Round or, How to Bring Developing
Countries in from the Cold”, The World Economy, 23, No. 4, 437-453.
Van Meijl, H. and F. Van Tongeren (2001). “Multilateral Trade Liberalization and
Developing Countries: a North-South Perspective on Agriculture and Processing
Sectors”, Paper prepared for the Fourth Annual Conference on Global Economic
Analysis, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN June 27-29 2001.
Whalley, J. (2000). “What Can the Developing Countries Infer from the Uruguay Round
Models for Future Negotiation”, UNCTAD Policy Issues in International Trade
and Commodities Study Series No. 4.
World Bank, (2001), Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries, The
World Bank, Washington D.C:
WTO (2001) Market Access: Unfinished Business. Post-Uruguay Round Inventory and


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(per cent of total
lines)
International peaks
(per cent of total lines)
Beef 16.16 12.89 41.35 52.11 29.58
Sheep meat 9.02 0.84 21.25 3.45 3.45
Poultry 33.33 8.16 134.3 2.52 2.52
Milk 56.33 22.7 140 17.78 17.78
Milk concentrates 105.02 19.59 308.5 22.15 22.15
Butter 100.54 249.97 336.25 32.47 19.48
Barley 41.73 22.12 101.5 11.43 11.43
Maize 13.19 3.99 50 4.00 4.00
Wheat 28.93 39.51 81.5 13.11 9.84
Banana 9.07 4.27 27.95 22.73 13.64
Citrus fruits 7.1 4.62 25.65 6.10 8.54
Other tropical fruits 8.57 10.68 33.25 14.86 8.11
Non-tropical fruits 5.6 0.77 17.75 1.45 2.90
Chocolate 40.55 22.72 276.5 34.21 14.33
Tobacco 97.97 44.86 350 6.25 6.25
Cigarettes 10.78 2.67 30 4.17 4.17
Cigars 6.95 10.14 17 0.00 10.00
Other tobacco prod. 115.49 168.57 350 16.46 17.72
Tea 5.96 3.82 17.75 11.11 11.11
Oil seeds 24.84 9.56 171 1.02 1.02
Vegetable oils 4.99 1.4 19.95 3.74 1.15
Source: Computations by the authors, based on the UNCTAD TRAINS database.2











Developing 8.42 8.61 225.00 3.05 22.51
Asian NICs 10.20 6.75 200.00 0.95 19.67
China 5.06 3.27 50.00 0.63 2.43
South Asia 12.57 19.44 200.00 0.81 55.12
Western Europe 1.10 0.16 21.20 1.02 0.01
North America 3.35 1.54 110.00 30.15 0.71
Transition 5.54 7.15 90.00 0.08 8.99
Sub-Saharan Africa 11.21 8.62 225.00 3.21 31.00
Oceania 3.45 3.53 28.00 4.28 0.55
N. Africa & M. East 5.26 8.06 55.00 0.46 10.75
Latin America 7.17 11.60 100.00 4.70 28.36
Japan 1.75 0.83 21.90 0.09 0.11
OECD 6.05 2.16 110.00 9.35 7.28
Source: Computations by the authors, based on the UNCTAD TRAINS database.Table 5. Tariff peaks in manufactures, by technology-based product groups in Quad markets, 2000
Product group Canada EU Japan United States
Standard deviation 7.67 3.60 6.61 7.44
DomesticPeaks (as a share of total
number of lines) 0.75 0.00 0.08 0.87
InternationalPeaks (as a share of total




Maximum rate 22,5 17 37,5 48
Standard deviation 3.60 2.14 1.85 4.03
DomesticPeaks (as a share of total
number of lines) 0.66 0.00 0.00 0.67
InternationalPeaks (as a share of total
number of lines) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02
Low Technology,
Manufactures, n.e.s.
 Maximum  rate 18.00 12.00 17.00 38.00
Standard deviation 3.12 5.85 0.00 5.25
DomesticPeaks (as a share of total
number of lines) n.a. 0.00 0.00 0.56
InternationalPeaks (as a share of total
number of lines) n.a. 0.16 0.00 0.04
Medium Technology,
Automotive Products
 Maximum  rate 13.00 22.00 0.00 25.00
Standard deviation 5.27 3.41 3.70 4.58
DomesticPeaks (as a share of total
number of lines) 0.59 0.00 0.00 0.74
InternationalPeaks (as a share of total




Maximum rate 20.50 12.00 27.20 23.10
Standard deviation 3.77 2.03 1.17 2.14
DomesticPeaks (as a share of total
number of lines) 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.38
InternationalPeaks (as a share of total
number of lines) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Medium Technology,
Engineering Industries
 Maximum  rate 25.00 14.00 8.40 14.00
Standard deviation 2.87 3.37 0.42 2.22
DomesticPeaks (as a share of total
number of lines) 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.48
InternationalPeaks (as a share of total




 Maximum  rate 9.50 14.00 3.30 15.00
Standard deviation 2.35 1.75 0.28 2.20
DomesticPeaks (as a share of total
number of lines) 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.38
InternationalPeaks (as a share of total
number of lines) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
High Technology, n.e.s
 Maximum  rate 11.00 7.70 3.90 16.00
Source: Computations by the authors, based on the UNCTAD TRAINS database.  The definition of product
groups follows Lall (2000).Table 6. Tariff escalation in Quad countries, by major product group (Weighted average MFN
applied tariffs in percentage, most recent years available in Trains)
Canada Japan US EU
Product group R S F R S F R S F R S F
Meat products 0.11 10.25 18.83 0.08 12.92 10.66 0.60 6.15 3.38 1.53 5.16 12.95
Dairy and egg products 1.94 .. 9.00 18.77 .. 17.39 2.82 .. 11.56 6.27 .. 7.70
Fish products 0.01 1.53 0.01 3.91 5.10 11.58 0.15 1.88 1.96 9.34 14.64 13.31
Sugar products 0.00 6.25 5.76 25.50 1.00 15.40 .. 5.82 7.48 17.30 .. 13.07
Cereal products 2.75 3.85 4.43 6.37 12.86 20.79 0.87 4.32 3.12 1.35 11.65 11.65
Vegetable oils 0.00 3.00 .. 0.14 4.20 .. 35.42 1.83 .. 0.00 1.10 ..
Coffee, tea and spices 0.08 0.00 5.14 1.63 10.60 20.02 0.37 0.07 5.35 0.11 8.63 8.00
Fruits and vegetables 0.89 4.56 3.16 7.07 8.44 17.92 2.94 6.07 3.95 8.12 8.02 19.15
Tobacco 7.79 .. 8.17 0.00 .. 0.07 68.26 .. 350.00 .. .. 24.81
Other food .. 5.70 7.90 .. 13.43 16.51 .. 13.00 6.98 .. 8.58 10.47
Animal food 0.01 3.17 0.26 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.61 2.27 0.00 0.71 4.55 0.00
Hides and skins 0.00 0.00 13.05 0.00 0.64 19.47 0.00 0.25 12.49 0.00 0.00 8.54
Chemicals 2.28 .. 3.46 2.55 .. 1.67 3.84 .. 2.10 2.92 .. 3.09
Fertilisers and minerals 0.18 .. 1.63 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.05 0.00 2.69 0.04 0.00 1.64
Petroleum products 0.00 .. 3.17 .. .. 1.08 .. .. 0.39 0.00 .. 0.91
Rubber products 0.00 0.00 5.53 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 2.98 0.00 0.13 3.61
Textiles 0.00 2.79 14.25 0.00 2.54 10.45 0.01 3.84 11.47 0.00 2.81 10.58
Metal products 0.00 .. 2.81 0.00 .. 0.87 0.00 .. 2.19 0.00 .. 2.88
Wood and Cork 0.49 0.17 3.21 0.00 1.02 2.38 0.36 0.09 0.83 0.00 0.27 2.26
Coal 0.01 0.82 .. 0.04 0.00 .. 0.00 0.00 .. 0.00 1.29 ..
Gas 1.73 6.50 .. 0.00 .. .. 0.00 0.00 .. 0.22 0.00 ..
Source: Computations by the authors, based on the UNCTAD TRAINS database.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Anderson, Hoekman, and Strutt, 1999. Model: Static, perfect competition.
Dataset: GTAP 3.
Full liberalization in all
countries in all sectors
260
Nagarajan, 1999. Model: Static, increasing return to scale
and imperfect competition in
manufacturing.
Dataset: GTAP 4.
50 per cent cut in agricultural
protection and implementation
of additional trade facilitation
measures.
385








Hertel, Anderson, Francois, and Martin,
1999.
Model: Dynamic, constant returns to
scale and perfect competition.
Dataset: GTAP 4.
40per cent cut in agricultural
tariff, export and production
subsidies.
70
Anderson, Francois, Hertel, Hoekman and
Martin, 2000








50per cent cut in agricultural
support
53 (GDP in 2010) Abare, 2000. Model: Static, perfect competition.
Dataset: GTAP 5.
50per cent cut in agricultural
support and 50per cent
reduction of import protection
in all other sectors
94 (GDP in 2010)





Francois, 2000b. Model: Dynamic, monopolistic
competition and imperfect competition
in manufacturing, increasing returns
from input variety.










Full removal of agricultural





Scollay and Gilbert, 2001. Model: Dynamic, imperfect sectoral
labour mobility.
Dataset: GTAP 4.
100per cent cut in agricultural
tariffs
69.43
World Bank, 2001 Model: Static and dynamic, constant
returns to scale.
Database: GTAP5
100per cent cut in
merchandise protection








Brown, Deardoff, and Stern, 2001. Model: Static, increasing returns to
scale, and monopolistic competition in
manufacturing.
Dataset: GTAP 4.
100per cent cut in agricultural
tariffs





100 per cent cut in agricultural
tariffs and in domestic
agricultural support
44.4 Van Meijl and Van Tongeren, 2001. Model:  Static, perfect competition.
Dataset: GTAP 5.
100 per cent cut in
merchandise protection.
78.3
*Data in the GTAP3, GTAP4 and GTAP databases are referred to, respectively, 1992, 1995, and 1997.
** If not specified otherwise, welfare changes are measured by Equivalent Variation changes, i.e., by the money transfers necessary to make individuals
indifferent between the status-quo and the post-reform situation.Table 9. Agricultural tariff liberalization. Welfare changes








Asian NICs 0.342 3363.6 -417.2 3840.4
China 0.082 964 -379.1 1387.6
South Asia 0.074 361.2 -205 599.5
Western Europe 0.021 1562.1 26.1 1574
North America 0.046 3613.3 3046.7 520.9
Transition Economies 0.118 900.8 -97.4 1023.9
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.072 226.2 -197 437.2
Oceania 0.419 1719.8 1646.7 76.4
North Africa and Middle
East
0.387 3033.8 -1720.7 4867.5
Latin America 0.073 1304.7 173.8 1126.9
Japan 0.116 4221.2 -2029.8 6019.8
Rest of the World 0.11 277.1 108 155
Total  21547.9 -44.9 21629
(50 per cent cut in all agricultural tariffs)
Table 10. Agricultural tariff liberalization. Aggregate trade data
 
Percentage change
Regions Exports Terms of
trade
Asian NICs 0.578 0.037
China 0.697 -0.059
South Asia 1.215 -0.243
Western Europe 0.340 0.038
North America 0.403 0.08
Transition Economies 1.150 -0.039






Latin America 1.042 0.042
Japan 1.196 -0.255
Rest of the World 1.843 0.183
(50 per cent worldwide cut in tariffs on processed agriculture)Table 11 Liberalization in agriculture: export subsidy removal. Welfare changes









Asian NICs -0.008 -73.9 -44.0 -10.9
China -0.015 -178.8 -53.8 -96.4
South Asia -0.000 -1.9 54.1 -56.3
Western Europe 0.033 2410.0 1699.7 628.8
North America -0.001 -88.0 94.6 -182.1
Transition Economies -0.117 -891.5 -515.1 -374.1
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.113 -354.9 -165.0 -192.3
Oceania 0.024 100.1 107.3 -3.6
North Africa and Middle
East
-0.283 -2209.7 -881.5 -1329.5
Latin America 0.004 80.3 82.3 -29.6
Japan -0.013 -484.9 -251.0 -170.2
Rest of the World -0.063 -158.7 -124.8 -43.2
Total -1851.7 2.8 -1859.3
Table 12. Liberalization in agriculture: export subsidy removal Aggregate trade data
  Per centage change
Regions Exports Terms of
trade
Asian NICs 0.008 -0.007
China 0.006 -0.013
South Asia 0.125 0.082
Western Europe -0.124 0.065
North America -0.013 0.013
Transition Economies -0.056 -0.172





Latin America 0.056 0.035
Japan -0.047 -0.061
Rest of the World -0.225         -0.189Table 13. Liberalization in agriculture: the role of tariff escalation Welfare changes









Asian NICs 0.101 994.9 212.6 804.7
China 0.04 475.4 -271 761.9
South Asia 0.047 230.7 -167 418.3
Western Europe 0.022 1613.2 936.2 742.4
North America 0.018 1415.7 946.5 478.1
Transition Economies 0.098 750 -97.1 857.7
Sub- Saharan Africa 0.049 153 -207.9 372.2
Oceania 0.232 951.4 899.4 51.9
North Africa and
Middle East 0.26 2036.4 -1168.5 3274.6
Latin America 0.057 1013.8 143.6 867.6
Japan 0.058 2127 -1323.8 3253.5
Rest of the World 0.096 242.1 80.2 140.4
Total   12003.4 -17 12023.3
(50 per cent worldwide cut in tariffs on processed agriculture)
Table 14. Liberalization in agriculture: the role of tariff escalation Aggregate trade data
  Per centage change
Regions Exports Terms of
trade
Asian NICs 0.101 0.037
China 0.04 -0.059
South Asia 0.047 -0.243
Western Europe 0.022 0.038
North America 0.018 0.08
Transition Economies 0.098 -0.039
Sub- Saharan Africa 0.049 -0.22
Oceania 0.232 1.003
North Africa and
Middle East 0.26 -0.408
Latin America 0.057 0.042
Japan 0.058 -0.255
Rest of the World 0.096 0.183
     (50 per cent worldwide cut in tariffs on processed agriculture)  Table 15 Non-reciprocal tariff liberalization in agriculture Welfare changes








Asian NICs 0.054 530.7 371.7 212.1
China 0.022 256.4 256.4 69.4
South Asia 0 -0.6 53 -42.8
Western Europe 0.003 220.7 -2158.7 2381.9
North America 0.017 1333.2 956.8 463.9
Transition Economies 0.071 545.5 410.4 129.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.054 168.7 125.7 43
Oceania 0.369 1512.2 1447.3 70.2
North Africa and
Middle East
0.003 26 54.9 -14.6
Latin America 0.045 812.9 578.8 215.2
Japan 0.109 3984.6 -2272.1 6077.4
Rest of the World 0.096 241.8 151.9 49.3
Total  9632.1 -23.8 9654.6
(50 per cent cut in all agricultural tariffs operated by developed countries only)
Table 16 Non-reciprocal tariff liberalization in agriculture. Aggregate trade data.
  Per centage change
Regions Exports Terms of
trade
Asian NICs 0.067 0.065
China 0.13 0.06
South Asia 0.263 0.08
Western Europe 0.369 -0.078









Latin America 0.342 0.176
Japan 1.495 -0.456
Rest of the World 0.933 0.365
(50 per cent cut in all agricultural tariffs operated by developed countries only)                   Table 17. A comprehensive liberalization scenario Welfare changes








Asian NICs 0.674 6636.5 1000.5 5467.6
China 0.424 5017.1 31.3 4727.2
South Asia 0.282 1383.3 -1282.3 2841.4
Western Europe 0.075 5489.6 1537 2968.9
North America 0.023 1778 435.7 1565.7
Transition Economies 0.079 603.1 -1260.8 2080.8
Sub- Saharan Africa 0.004 13.3 -889.5 1022.9
Oceania 0.386 1584.1 1310.5 233
North Africa and
Middle East 0.476 3735.8 -2315.7 6350.7
Latin America 0.079 1414 -2358.2 4289.9
Japan 0.307 11207.4 3619.4 7441.4
Rest of the World 0.281 706.3 96.9 706.9
Total   39568.5 -75.1 39696.4
(50 per cent cut worldwide cut in tariffs on all merchandise trade)
                          Table 18. A comprehensive liberalization scenario Aggregate trade data
 Percentage  change
Regions Exports Terms of
trade
Asian NICs 3.899 0.168
China 7.458 0.012
South Asia 12.043 -1.747
Western Europe 1.105 0.078
North America 2.591 -0.008
Transition Economies 3.86 -0.483
Sub- Saharan Africa 4.59 -0.927
Oceania 4.265 1.435
North Africa and
Middle East 5.004 -0.806
Latin America 5.719 -0.734
Japan 5.512 0.752
Rest of the World 8.789 0.091
(50 per cent cut worldwide cut in tariffs on all merchandise trade)CREDIT PAPERS
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